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Local Resilience Forum

Report to the Fylingdales Moor Fire 2025

Part 1 Response

Event:	Response to the Fylingdales Moor Fire 2025		
Date(s) of event:	30 June (Initial NYLRF Response to Major and Critical Incidents (RMCI) notification email) - 5 September (Stand down of NYLRF Major Incident)		
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	D2. JESIP and command tactics – Non NYLRF organisations		11.12.25
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Debrief location:	Tactical Coordination Centre, North Yorkshire Council County Hall, Northallerton, DL7 8TD		
Debrief commissioned by:	NYLRF Chair		
Debrief team:	Ryan Chapman	Chair D1	North Yorkshire Police
	Gemma Tate	Scribe D1	North Yorkshire Police
	Dave Dixon	Chair D2&D3	North Yorkshire Fire and Rescue
	Deborah Plant	Scribe D2&D3	North Yorkshire Fire and Rescue
	Grace Lawes	Scribe D4 Chair D5	North Yorkshire Council
	Alex Sutcliffe	Scribe D5	North Yorkshire Council
	Matthew Robinson	Chair D6	North Yorkshire Council
	Wendy Muldoon	Scribe D6	North Yorkshire Council
It was signed off by:	Richard Flinton NYLRF Chair	18.06.26	NYLRF Executive Board June 2026
Author:	Matthew Robinson	matthew.robinson@northyorks.gov.uk	

Cover image: Paul Edwards

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Local Resilience Forum Chair introduction

In the summer of 2025, North Yorkshire experienced the most extensive and devastating wildfire ever recorded in the county, sweeping across one of our most treasured areas of moorland. The fire on Fylingdales Moor, within the North York Moors National Park, was the first Major Incident here since the Covid-19 pandemic, and required a significant and sustained effort to contain. At its height the blaze covered approximately 20 square kilometres and the vast smoke plume hovered above our moors and coastal communities for weeks.

The location of the fire presented many challenges. It began in an extremely remote area of the forest with limited access to water sources to fight it. The affected area lay close to RAF Fylingdales, a vital part of the UK air security system, and which had historically been used as a military training range. The site was littered with unexploded military ordnance posing a serious danger to firefighters on the ground. During the response there were more than 20 'cook offs' or explosions, under the intense heat of the flames. The area is also a Site of Special Scientific Interest.

Landowners, common graziers, reactive farmers, and local businesses were directly impacted through loss of grassland for livestock, evacuation, access restrictions, and uninsurable business interruption. Many of those affected also played a critical role in supporting the emergency response that protected RAF Fylingdales, designated conservation sites, and key economic assets.

The tireless efforts of responding fire crews, farmers, and local communities during the fire deserves high commendation. The evident risks and hazards meant that individuals demonstrated truly heroic actions in helping to fight the extensive flames, fanned by continuously changing winds.

The joint working that underpinned the response to this incident is testament to the strength of the North Yorkshire Local Resilience Forum (NYLRF) network and the clear culture of shared ownership in supporting the communities of York and North Yorkshire.

I would like to thank all agencies, officers, volunteers and communities who were involved in the response to this terrible incident, as well as those who contributed to this debrief process. The open and transparent conversations brought forward by agencies were invaluable in identifying key learning. While debriefs often focus on areas for improvement and recommendations, it is clear that the knowledge, experience, and skills demonstrated by those involved prevented the incident from becoming even more significant. Environmental and economic recovery impacts will continue for decades, and in some respects much longer. However, the fact that no lives were lost and no buildings were damaged is solely due to the fearless and tireless efforts of North Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service (NYFRS), a broad range of partner agencies, and the people and communities of Fylingdales and beyond.

That said, where lessons are identified, we must acknowledge them so that we can continue to develop our capacity and capabilities. The summer of 2025 was unprecedented, but in light of our changing climate, we must ensure we are prepared for future wildfire incidents.

Richard Flinton
Chair of the NYLRF Executive

Photo: Mark Laycock

Section 1 Overview

1.1 What is the North Yorkshire Local Resilience Forum

The NYLRF is a partnership of organisations working together to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and identify learning from Major Incidents or emergencies in York and North Yorkshire.

It includes local emergency service responders - police, fire and ambulance - local authorities, health organisations, the Ministry of Defence, Government Departments and voluntary organisations. Many of the agencies within the forum are legally required to deliver their own duties set out in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

1.2 Background of report

Following the stand down of the response phase the NYLRF undertook a debrief into the multi-agency response to the Fylingdales Moor fire incident. This identified good practice, areas for improvement and recommendations to support continuous improvement.

The aims, objectives and scope of the debrief are found at Appendix A.

One of the objectives was to develop a report that could complement the North Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Investigation Report and North Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Single Agency Debrief.

1.3 Aim of the NYLRF report into Fylingdales Moor Fire 2025 Part 1 Response

To produce a report on the NYLRF multi-agency debrief findings from the response to the Fylingdales Moor Fire of 2025.

View from Whitby Highways Depot. Photo: Neil Wattis

Section 2 Incident Overview

2.1 Map of incident



Map 1. Location of Fylingdales Moor Fire



Map 2. Approximate extent of fire following the Coast Guard mapping on the 30.08.2025

2.2 Weather conditions

In the period leading up to the Fylingdales Moor fire in 2025, a sustained spell of warm, dry weather created conditions that were significantly more susceptible to a fire of this scale. Spring 2025 was recorded by the Met Office as the warmest and sunniest on record, followed by the hottest summer. North Yorkshire experienced prolonged periods of drought throughout 2025, and a hosepipe ban had been in place across Yorkshire since 11 July 2025.

Day-by-day weather data is located at Appendix D.

2.3 Fire and Rescue and the Local Resilience Forum response timeline

On the 26 June 2025 at 18:38 a 999 call was made to NYFRS Control by a member of the public who was out hiking. This first notification of a fire was located in Langdale Forest, adjacent to Fylingdales Moor. Four appliances attended. This incident triggered the initial warning systems of the NYLRF via a Response to Major or Critical Incident (RMCI) notification email on **30 June 2025** at **13:04.** At that stage, the fire ground measured approximately 100 metres by 100 metres and did not require multi-agency coordination. NYFRS closed this initial incident on **4 July 2025** through an incident handover form with Forestry England.

On 11 August 2025 at 17:05, NYFRS were notified that there was a large amount of smoke in the area around Langdale Forest. Following initial operational assessments it was determined that the fire breached a firebreak with approximately one to two acres of forest on fire. A new RMCI Notification for the incident was sent on the 12 August 2025 at 12:50, which was updated at 15:25.

A Multi-Agency Advisory Teleconference (MAAT) was convened the same day at 21:00 to provide partner briefings and undertake a Joint Decision Model (JDM) assessment in line with the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP).

NYFRS's ability to conduct an offensive firefighting strategy was significantly compromised by repeated, unidentified and unintended explosions referred to as "cook-offs" caused by live, unexploded ordnance. These were remnants of the site's use as a military training area during World War II. **The incident was declared a Major Incident on 13 August 2025, prompting activation of the NYLRF Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) and Strategic Coordination Group (SCG).**

A prolonged period of hot, dry weather with no rainfall allowed the underlying peat beds to continue burning. On **25 August 2025**, a change in wind direction combined with strong gusts created a large and powerful flame front that breached the northern firebreak. The fire moved northwards from Langdale Forest across Fylingdales Moor. At its peak, the fire boundary covered approximately 20 square kilometres, and a substantial smoke plume affected surrounding communities. This event represents the largest wildfire in the recorded history of the North York Moors National Park. It was widely acknowledged that the August incident was a continuation of the June incident.

The multi-agency coordinated response continued until **5 September 2025** when there was a handover to the multi-agency recovery groups.

2.4 Rural location of the incident

Roads in the area were closed due to smoke and to maintain emergency access routes. Evacuation and shelter arrangements were required for nearby caravan and campsite occupants and public health advice was issued for those in close proximity to the smoke plume.

2.5 Community impacts of the incident

Roads in the area were closed due to smoke and to allow emergency access. The evacuation and shelter of nearby caravan and camps sites were required, as well as public health advice for those in the proximity of the smoke plume.

Photo: Mark Laycock

2.6 Response to recovery

During the response phase, the NYLRF established a series of coordination groups and supporting cells to ensure continued adherence to the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP). At the strategic level, it is recognised as best practice to initiate recovery structures at the earliest opportunity so they can operate in parallel with the response. Recovery structures were initially established during the first phase of the NYLRF response and groups met from the 14 August until the escalation of the incident over the bank holiday. The groups then reconvened on the 2 September in preparation for the handover.

Although the NYLRF formally transitioned from response to recovery arrangements on 5 September, the NYFRS Major Incident status remained in place until 23 September 2025. During this period, active firefighting operations gradually shifted towards a coordinated recovery phase focused on damage assessment, clean-up activity, and long-term restoration planning across the affected area. NYFRS formally closed the incident on 22 December 2025. The learning from the recovery phase of the incident is not included within this report.

Photo: NYFRS

2.7 Local Resilience Forum support during the incident

Between **30 June and 12 August**, the NYLRF had limited involvement in the coordination of the incident. The NYLRF was notified of the initial fire; however, the location, size, and scale of the incident meant that there was no requirement to formally convene responding agencies at that stage.

This phase of the incident was coordinated by Fire and Rescue, working alongside local landowners and Forestry England. On **4 July**, responsibility for the incident was handed over to Forestry England. Although this phase was appropriately not coordinated through the NYLRF, it was widely acknowledged that the August incident was a continuation of the June incident.

The review of this stage of the incident is currently being conducted through the Fire Investigation process and the internal Fire and Rescue debrief. As such, it is considered out of scope for the NYLRF debrief.

NYFRS attended the location on **11 August**. Following developments on **12 August**, NYFRS promptly notified the NYLRF and appropriately triggered NYLRF processes, engaging partner agencies to inform them of the evolving risk. The "cook off" of unexploded ordnance (UXO) required a significant change in firefighting tactics and the requirement to protect Critical National Infrastructure at RAF Fylingdales led to the declaration of a Major Incident. However, given the remote location of the incident and the assessed low risk to the wider public, coordination continued at the Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) level.

During this phase, there was a joint operational response involving Fire and Rescue, Forestry England, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and local landowners. A range of resources and tactics were deployed, including helicopters, the creation of initial firebreaks prioritised to protect RAF Fylingdales and Forestry England land, and defensive firefighting activity along established fire tracks and towards River Head Farm.

These tactics were further supported during the subsequent phase of the response by partner agencies through the provision of water bowsers, drone support, topping and additional vehicles. While there were understandable operational challenges, these measures collectively supported efforts to prevent further escalation of the fire.

To support Fire and Rescue in managing the incident, and in recognition of their operational pressures, it was agreed that other agencies would assume responsibility for chairing the Tactical Coordination Group (TCG). Coordination through the TCG facilitated effective joint working and supported operational interaction between Fire and Rescue and partner agencies.

On the **14 August**, a request was made by the operational Fire and Rescue Commander due to the continuing spread of the fire within the sectorisation of the incident. At that time, defensive and offensive tactics were being implemented in some, but not all sectors, with support from EOD, following advice that firefighters should not enter the risk area of the fire ground and should operate only from the perimeter. It was understood that, without further intervention, the fire was likely to burn into the peat and persist until winter. While helicopters proved effective in suppressing some advancing flame fronts, they were not capable of fully extinguishing the fire.

Discussions therefore focused on developing a more robust containment strategy, including the establishment of a hard boundary around the fire, either through continued perimeter suppression using water or by constructing a complete circumferential firebreak.

Fire and Rescue requested support from partner agencies to access additional capabilities, including excavators. Given the presence of UXO and the scale of the affected area, it was recognised that the associated costs would require strategic discussion and approval.

As a result, a Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) was convened on **15 August**. Three proposals for a circumferential trench-based firebreak were presented. Having considered the financial implications, operational feasibility, timescales, and environmental impacts, the SCG tasked the Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) with developing a prioritised fire-break approach. Fire and Rescue Service also indicated their intention to seek Government support through the Bellwin Scheme.

Efforts continued to establish firebreaks through trenching to the west and south of the fire ground. On the northern boundary, Operational Commanders adopted a hybrid firebreak approach based on advice from Wildfire Tactical Advisors. This involved surface fuel separation to reduce the risk of surface fire spread and was informed by ongoing assessments of risk, operational effectiveness, environmental impacts, resource requirements and overall cost-benefit.

NYLRF structures continued to offer support to operational commanders in managing the existing affected area; however, on **25 August** the fire breached an existing fire track. This firebreak was a track which had been strengthened using water bowsers and sections had been cut to maximise the distance between fuels. The fire spread north towards Sneaton High Moor and the edge of the moors.

At this stage, it was clear that the fire was capable of jumping significant distances, as demonstrated as it spread over the two-lane carriageway of the B1416. During the subsequent phase of the incident, the Strategic and Tactical Coordination Groups worked closely to support Fire and Rescue and assist affected communities. Efforts focused on managing the dynamic risks posed by the fire, while also considering reasonable worst case scenarios over the following days and weeks. This joint working included consideration of:

Capacity and capability

Availability and cost of resources

Given the scale of the incident, one of the most significant risks identified early on by the NYLRF was the Fire and Rescue Service (NYFRS) ability to access and fund the resources required to manage the fire. To manage the risk, costs were tracked and high-cost options (including extensive firebreak activity, contractor mobilisation and helicopter support) were assessed for value for money and affordability. Timely escalation to the strategic level ensured that funding options were explored early, including approaching central government about the Bellwin scheme and securing partner contributions where appropriate (for example, defence funding for critical infrastructure protection). Establishing a Logistics Cell also ensured that the right specialist support and assets were identified and mobilised effectively including aerial surveillance, heavy plant machinery and water bowsers. The NYLRF also supported the establishment of a Strategic Holding Area to support national assets and managed the intake of offers of help in a controlled way.

Humanitarian

Risk to residents and people in proximity of the fire

The fire itself posed a risk to the physical safety of those in proximity to it. NYLRF supported risk mitigation primarily through coordinated warning and informing and evacuation planning.

Warning and Informing

While the NYFRS led public warning and informing, messages were reviewed and amplified by partners (coordinated through a Communications Cell), which ensured the publication of consistent safety advice (see also Risk of smoke inhalation) on the NYLRF website and elsewhere. Further to this, the National Park Authority managed the physical closure of public rights of way and signage to deter members of the public from accessing the area recreationally.

Photo: Mark Laycock

Evacuation and community impact planning

NYLRF first commissioned a Community Impact Assessment when the Multi-Agency Advisory Teleconference (MAAT) was escalated to a Tactical Coordination Group (TCG). The assessment was kept under review and updated as the fire footprint and smoke plume changed. As the incident escalated and the fire threatened specific properties, partners supported timely action and liaison with affected sites (including caravan parks and other premises within wooded areas).

A humanitarian coordination function was also activated to support information gathering on affected people and align local authority support. Temporary support locations were identified and used where needed to provide immediate assistance and reassurance to affected residents, alongside the assumption that most people would make their own arrangements with friends and family. As part of wider contingency planning, the Evacuation and Shelter Cell also developed proportionate, zone-based evacuation plans for urban areas that considered rest centres, transport, communication (including the use of emergency alerts) and vulnerable groups.

Risk of smoke inhalation and impacts to health

To manage the risk posed by the smoke plume and degraded air quality, NYLRF convened environmental health, public health and UK Health Security Agency partners early on to assess potential impacts and agree proportionate control measures. This included monitoring smoke density using available fixed monitoring stations, supported by on-the-ground visual observations (further mobile monitors were found not to be suitable in this instance). Subject matter experts supported the development of clear, consistent public health messages to complement NYFRS communications, which advised residents to take sensible precautions, including remaining indoors where appropriate and protecting those more vulnerable to smoke. The partnership also ensured that neighbouring NYLRF areas that might be affected were informed and asked local NHS trusts and relevant health system partners to monitor for people presenting with respiratory symptoms. Where community concern increased, partners kept under review whether additional public-facing support arrangements were needed and agreed to continue signposting to existing information and emergency contact routes unless the situation escalated.

Risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO)

The presence of historic munitions in the fire area presented a significant risk to firefighters, land managers and contractors undertaking firefighting and firebreak activity. Managing this risk was a central theme of NYLRF response activity, working with the Ministry of Defence and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) partners to identify, map and mitigate ordnance risk. This enabled EOD presence onsite to advise on safe working, particularly during excavation activity.

Clear risk zones and safe working assumptions (for example, prioritising work along established tracks where appropriate) were agreed and contractors were briefed and re-briefed as the footprint and depth of proposed trenching changed. Explosions or "cook-offs" were logged and shared through the coordination arrangements to support dynamic risk assessment.

The partnership also adapted Op Tapestry processes so that EOD attendance could be triggered and managed in a proportionate way as the fire site was brought under control. Residual UXO risk was transferred into recovery and infrastructure arrangements for continued management.

Photo: Paul Edwards

Risk to responder welfare

NYLRF recognised the importance of maintaining responder welfare throughout the incident, arranging for the provision of appropriate facilities at relevant sites, as well as promoting the use of Major Incident Response Team (MIRT) volunteers as required. As operational activity moved and access routes changed, the NYLRF maintained a watching brief on welfare impacts (including where welfare facilities were distant from the active sectors) and supported practical solutions through partner agencies, including highways support where required.

The presence of historic munitions in the fire area presented a significant risk to firefighters, land managers and contractors undertaking firefighting and firebreak activity. Photo: Mark Laycock

Infrastructure

Disruption to critical national infrastructure

The location of the fire posed an active risk to RAF Fylingdales, a site of importance to national security. NYLRF therefore played a significant role in maintaining partner awareness of how the site could be affected, discussing options for mitigation and coordinating defence and civilian assets in support of air quality monitoring, aerial surveillance and firebreak activity. NYLRF ensured that defence partners were embedded in multi-agency coordination arrangements and that relevant site considerations were captured in shared mapping and situational reporting, while respecting the sensitive nature of RAF Fylingdales' operations.

Disruption to transport and utilities

Transport

The fire and accompanying smoke plume affected strategically important roads that connect several East Coast urban areas, as well as a number of smaller interconnecting roads. NYLRF facilitated tactical and operational decision making on road closures, where necessary to keep the public and responders safe, supported by shared mapping, diversion routes and police presence where high levels of non-compliance with closures were reported. As conditions stabilised at the fire site, routes were reopened in a controlled way with temporary speed restrictions, signage and enforcement activity, alongside continued patrols and management of laybys to deter unsafe stopping near the incident. Highway inspections and cleaning activity (including removal of debris and mud) helped to maintain emergency service and contractor access and safety considerations were reviewed regularly as part of the coordinated tactical response.

Utilities

Utility providers were embedded in multi-agency governance structures throughout the response to help assess potential risks to utilities in the vicinity of the fire and maintain access to water as a critical firefighting resource (by coordinating tanker support, identifying potential additional storage solutions and using strategic hydrant information where relevant). As the fire footprint expanded, infrastructure considerations also included the management of site-specific risks, including, for example, liaising with the Hawsker mine to support their evacuation plans and the safe movement of any hazardous materials and supplies.

Photo: Mark Laycock

Environment

Risk of damage to the environment

The wildfire posed risks to SSSI land, peat deposits and the wider environment.

To mitigate those risks, Natural England and other subject matter experts from the North York Moors National Park Authority and elsewhere were embedded into NYLRF response structures to help advise on firebreaks, back-burning and peat protection. Water abstraction and firefighting methods were also reviewed and adjusted where environmental concerns arose, if appropriate and proportionate to do so.

As the incident footprint expanded, partners also coordinated access to relevant environmental and heritage mapping (including ancient monuments) and discussed potential measures to mitigate avoidable damage during heavy plant and firefighting activity. Environmental risks were discussed in detail in response and recovery cells, which established specific impact assessments that were made available on ResilienceDirect.

Langdale. Photo: NYFRS

Economic disruption to businesses and tourism

In addition to sustained financial pressure on responder agencies, the fire posed a risk to tourism and local businesses in the affected area. Potential economic impacts and reputational considerations (including tourism and "open for business" messaging) were highlighted by the NYLRF's response structures and considered proactively by the Economic recovery cell where they remain subject to longer-term management.

Conclusion

During the response to the Fylingdales Moor wildfire, the NYLRF partnership added value by providing a consistent framework for multi-agency coordination that maintained shared situational awareness and enabled timely, proportionate decision-making. This was achieved not only through SCGs and TCGs but through the establishment of functional cells (notably Logistics, Communications and Evacuation and Shelter), which coordinated specialist capabilities and sustained welfare and logistics to support a prolonged response. A key contribution was the creation and maintenance of a single common operating picture and action tracker where risks, decisions and actions were logged, supported by shared maps that highlighted access, road closures and UXO risk, enabling safer deployment of responders, contractors and heavy plant.

The partnership also coordinated public warning and informing (including around smoke and health impacts and the closure of roads or other rights of way) and supported an orderly and timely transition to recovery through structured risk handover, subgroup governance and agreed information sharing arrangements.

Langdale. Photo: Paul Edwards

Section 3 Recommendations

The table below sets out the recommendations agreed by the Debrief Team. While this is not an exhaustive record of all information gathered through feedback questionnaires and debrief sessions, it highlights the priority areas that will support continuous learning. NYLRF activities are coordinated through an annual work plan, and it is intended that this learning will be incorporated into the 2026–2027 work plan.

It is recognised that many additional and more specific examples of good practice and areas for improvement were identified. These were captured during the earlier stages of the debrief process and logged within the NYLRF continuous improvement lessons management process and in a number of areas have already been integrated into new ways of working.

The recommendations within this report are based on high-level themes rather than a large number of detailed, specific learning items. The Debrief Team anticipates that the strategic nature of the recommendations will enable further work to be undertaken to support more explicit and comprehensive learning.

The recommendations in this report were discussed with the NYLRF Coordination Group Chair and the NYLRF Secretariat before being agreed by the NYLRF Chair. The report was subsequently submitted to the NYLRF Coordination Group, the NYLRF Executive Board, and the Fylingdales Recovery Coordination Group.

3.1 Recommendations rating

Colour Rating	Description
Red	High Priority Recommendation - to be escalated to NYLRF Coordination Group / Executive Board / impacts NYLRF workplan / not linked to existing activity / resource required
Amber	Medium Priority Recommendation - to be escalated to NYLRF Coordination Group / may involve new ways of working / process changes / linked with existing aims and objectives / resource required
Yellow	Low Priority Action – Minor change and can be easily implemented
Green	No Action Required

Ref	Category	Issue / Learning Point	Recommendation	Suggested Lead	Suggested Priority
No		*What is the identified lesson*	*What is the recommended action*	*Single agency, Multi-agency, NYLRF Group*	*Red, Amber, Yellow, Green*
1	*Process Knowledge Training*	The debrief confirms that the NYLRF has established agreed arrangements for achieving JESIP at operational, tactical, and strategic levels, and that the Response to Major and Critical Incident (RMCI) Plan represents good practice in meeting these principles. However, during the incident it was evident that, although JESIP was applied at the operational, tactical, and strategic levels, there were occasions where a lack of alignment between command levels affected shared situational awareness and the joint assessment of risk. It was also apparent that a number of agencies not routinely involved in the NYLRF had little or no prior knowledge of JESIP. While no fundamental changes are required, the debrief highlights a number of areas relating to knowledge, training, and processes that could be strengthened.	**1.1** A review should be undertaken on the Response to Major and Critical Incident (RMCI) Plan. This review should strengthen the processes, knowledge, and training associated with the roles and responsibilities required to coordinate an NYLRF incident, as well as the development of the supporting documentation that accompanies multi-agency responses.	NYLRF Emergency Planning Group	**Amber**
			1.2 This review should consider how non NYLRF organisations can quickly access incident information from systems such as ResilienceDirect.	NYLRF Emergency Planning Group	
			1.3 The review should also include a discussion at the NYLRF Executive Board regarding the most appropriate approach to ensuring that agencies have the necessary capacity and capability to fulfil the roles and responsibilities of Tactical and Strategic Commanders in future incidents.	NYLRF Executive Board	
			1.4 That the NYLRF Training, Exercise, and Development Group further develops the training requirements for the roles identified within the RMCI to ensure ongoing capability and continual professional development. This work should be completed and implemented prior to March 2027.	NYLRF Training, Exercise and Development Group	
			1.5 Consideration should be given to how best to support non-LRF organisations involved in this incident, and in future incidents, to improve their understanding and application of JESIP.	NYLRF Training, Exercise and Development Group	

Ref	Category	Issue / Learning Point	Recommendation	Suggested Lead	Suggested Priority
No		*What is the identified lesson*	*What is the recommended action*	*Single agency, Multi-agency, NYLRF Group*	*Red, Amber, Yellow, Green*
2	*Process*	During the Fylingdales Moor incident, a number of response cells and groups were established to support the Tactical and Strategic Coordination Groups. This approach was viewed as beneficial and provided valuable assistance in delivering specific themed areas of work, representing examples of good practice. However, the debriefs highlighted inconsistencies in membership and differing views on how these cells and groups could be further developed, including the potential creation of additional structures.	**2.1** By March 2027, the NYLRF Emergency Planning Group should further develop the roles, responsibilities, processes, and documentation required for the following cells and groups: • Communications Cell • Evacuation and Shelter Cell • Scientific, Technical and Advice Cell • Logistics Cell • Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC) • Vulnerable Persons and Humanitarian Assistance Cell	NYLRF Emergency Planning Group	**Amber**
			2.2 By March 2027, the NYLRF Emergency Planning Group should also discuss and agree whether the following cells and groups should be established during an incident to support the overall response: • Multi-agency Welfare of Staff Cell • Donations and Appeals Cell	NYLRF Emergency Planning Group	
			2.3 Any changes should be incorporated into the RMCI, and an appendix should be developed for each cell or group to define organisational roles, responsibilities, and scope.	NYLRF Emergency Planning Group	

Ref	Category	Issue / Learning Point	Recommendation	Suggested Lead	Suggested Priority
No		*What is the identified lesson*	*What is the recommended action*	*Single agency, Multi-agency, NYLRF Group*	*Red, Amber, Yellow, Green*
3	*Equipment Process*	Throughout this incident, a number of multi-agency partners were able to access and provide specialist equipment and vehicles. These included heavy plant machinery, welfare units, Starlink internet provision, planes, helicopters, drones, aerial and satellite imagery, and heat detection. Fire and Rescue reported that the command processes particularly the Logistics Cell were effective in securing these resources, and this should be regarded as good practice.	**3.1** Prior to January 2027, the NYLRF Secretariat should organise, as part of an NYLRF Working Day, a number of workshops or exercises and invite those officers or organisations able to access specialist equipment at short notice. Any learning from this event should then be incorporated into the Logistics Cell processes.	NYLRF Secretariat	**Amber**
4	*Knowledge Process*	Information gathered from the debriefs and one-to-one discussions highlighted differing levels of understanding regarding how the UK Government emergency financial assistance mechanism called the Bellwin Scheme could have been utilised to support a wildfire incident. Between 15 August 2025 and 25 August 2025, the Tactical Coordination Group carried out regular assessments on the need for firebreaks. Fire Officers advised throughout this period that existing fire fighting tactics were sufficient to manage the incident. There were, however, several discussions about the potential financial implications of creating a northern firebreak. Although contractors were available and ready to deploy, the Tactical Coordination Group ultimately decided not to proceed with its construction.	**4.1** That the NYLRF Executive Board continues to liaise with members of the MHCLG Bellwin Team to share its views on the Fylingdales Moor Fire incident and to offer learning arising from this event.	NYLRF Secretariat	**Amber**

Ref	Category	Issue / Learning Point	Recommendation	Suggested Lead	Suggested Priority
No		*What is the identified lesson*	*What is the recommended action*	*Single agency, Multi-agency, NYLRF Group*	*Red, Amber, Yellow, Green*
5	*Process*	The current assessment for wildfire in the NYLRF Community Risk Register is Yellow, indicating a medium level risk. Although the impacts of the Fylingdales Moor fire were unprecedented and severe, officers involved in the debriefs did not feel that the current assessment was accruate when considered alongside other risks within the Community Risk Register. The debrief did, however, highlight the need to strengthen how information from other groups, incident debriefs, and local knowledge is fed into the NYLRF Risk and Capabilities Group's processes.	**5.1** That NYFRS continue to provide to the NYLRF Risk and Capability Group updates on their single agency review into their capabilities to respond to wildfire incidents. These should occur both during the assessment of the specific wildfire risk as well as during the Risk Horizon Scanning meetings. **5.2** That the NYLRF Risk and Capability Group considers whether additional steps should be introduced when reviewing risks within the Community Risk Register. These could include: • Requesting the Continuous Improvement Lessons Management Group to access information from Joint Organisational Learning or other learning reports to inform risk assessments. • Inviting existing groups outside the NYLRF such as the North Yorkshire Wildfire Group to provide presentations or information to support the group's understanding of current prevention and preparedness activity. • Making more effective use of the Integrated Emergency Management Groups (IEMG) to share information from the Community Risk Register or to request their support when reviewing risks.	NYFRS NYLRF Risk and Capabilities Group	**Amber**

Ref	Category	Issue / Learning Point	Recommendation	Suggested Lead	Suggested Priority
No		*What is the identified lesson*	*What is the recommended action*	*Single agency, Multi-agency, NYLRF Group*	*Red, Amber, Yellow, Green*
6	*Process Knowledge Training*	Both during the response to the Fylingdales Moor fire and in day-to-day NYLRF planning, the debrief highlighted that a number of organisations and partnerships currently sit outside of formal NYLRF processes. The NYLRF is made up of organisations identified under the Civil Contingencies Act. However, to support a whole-society approach, there are additional organisations that can contribute valuable capabilities, knowledge, and skills. During incidents, a number of non NYLRF organisations can support the overall response, and it was felt that there could be clearer multi-agency understanding of the regulatory responsibilities of these non NYLRF organisations within Major Incident command structures. During the Fylingdales Moor incident, this included bodies such as the York and North Yorkshire Mayoral Combined Authority, North York Moors National Park, Forestry England, Natural England, Historic England, RAF Fylingdales, and the Woodsmith Mine. Future incidents will undoubtedly require the involvement of other non NYLRF organisations.	**6.1** Where NYLRF Sub Groups identify appropriate and proportionate opportunities to widen their membership to non NYLRF organisations, they should be encouraged to do so.	NYLRF Sub Groups	**Yellow**
			6.2 At the same time, the NYLRF Strategic Sponsor for Partnerships, the NYLRF Coordination Group Chair, and the NYLRF Secretariat should continue to meet regularly to drive progress against the objectives set out in the NYLRF Strategy 2025–2030.	NYLRF Strategic Sponsor for Partnerships	
			6.3 This should include a discussion at the future NYLRF Executive Board on improving multi-agency understanding of the regulatory responsibilities of non-NYLRF organisations within Major Incident command structures.	NYLRF Coordination Group Chair, and the NYLRF Secretariat	
7	*Process*	The Fylingdales Moor fire was the first incident of this scale since the establishment of the York and North Yorkshire Mayoral Combined Authority. The debrief identified that some political officials felt the updates they received during the early stages of the incident were not sufficiently timely to enable them to carry out their duties effectively. The debrief also highlighted the need for further work to establish clear triggers and expectations for how Political Officials and Emergency Services coordinate their communication strategies during the initial phase of an incident.	**7.1** That the NYLRF Communications Group Chair and the York and North Yorkshire Mayoral Combined Authority review the existing arrangements for notifying and liaising with the York and North Yorkshire Mayor, Members of Parliament and Elected members during a Major Incident.	NYLRF Communications Group Chair	**Amber**
			7.2 This should consider how the SCG Chair and NYLRF Chair notify the Mayoral Office of the declaration of a Major Incident and set out the mechanisms for keeping the Mayoral Office informed of incident progression and the co-ordinated communications strategy.		

Ref	Category	Issue / Learning Point	Recommendation	Suggested Lead	Suggested Priority
No		*What is the identified lesson*	*What is the recommended action*	*Single agency, Multi-agency, NYLRF Group*	*Red, Amber, Yellow, Green*
8	*Process*	Across the Communications Debrief, as well as within other themed debriefs, a number of areas of good practice and areas for improvement were identified in relation to the coordination of communications during a Major Incident. It should be acknowledged that the NYLRF Communications Group has already initiated a review of the NYLRF Communications Plan to embed this learning, and this proactive approach should be commended.	**8.1** That the NYLRF Communications Group reviews all information identified within the themed debriefs. The group should ensure that any agreed areas of good practice or areas for improvement are incorporated into the Communications Plan review, and that the updated plan is ready to be exercised no later than September 2026.	NYLRF Communications Group	**Amber**
9	*Process*	Flooding continues to be regarded as a highly likely and high-impact risk facing North Yorkshire and the wider UK. As a result, a number of nationally agreed processes are in place, including the DEFRA Flood Rescue Concept of Operations. By contrast, no equivalent nationally agreed processes currently exist for wildfire risk. It is therefore considered that, in light of the changing climate, discussions should take place on the value of developing a nationally agreed approach to wildfire response.	**9.1** The NYLRF to support NYFRS and Government Departments with any learning from the Fylingdales Moor fire which could assist in the development or review of any national frameworks. This would look to identify the capabilities and capacities required to assist in management of future wildfires.	NYLRF Secretariat	**Amber**

Ref	Category	Issue / Learning Point	Recommendation	Suggested Lead	Suggested Priority
No		*What is the identified lesson*	*What is the recommended action*	*Single agency, Multi-agency, NYLRF Group*	*Red, Amber, Yellow, Green*
10	*Process*	In the period leading up to the Fylingdales Moor Fire, a sustained spell of warm, dry weather created conditions that were significantly more susceptible to a fire of this scale. Spring 2025 was recorded by the Met Office as the warmest and sunniest on record, followed by the hottest summer on record. North Yorkshire experienced prolonged periods of drought throughout 2025, and a hosepipe ban had been in place across Yorkshire since 11 July 2025. Although the cause of the fire has been recorded as likely originating from cooking using a naked flame, such as a campfire or gas burner, it was also evident that there was combustible material present on the moors. While the NYLRF partnership coordinates work to anticipate incidents, assess their impacts on communities, and prepare and validate plans for response and recovery, it also has an important role in advocating for prevention.	**10.1** That the NYLRF Executive Board discusses the Fylingdales Incident and agrees how best to provide data and learning from the event to support any national discussions on wildfire prevention.	NYLRF Executive Board	**Amber**
			10.2 That the NYLRF Communications Group continues to develop its multi-agency forward look to support preventative media messaging for wildfire and other incidents.	NYLRF Communications Group	
11	*Process* *Knowledge* *Training* *Equipment*	During the Fylingdales Moor incident Fire and Rescue debrief and the NYLRF debrief, a number of specific areas of good practice, aspects requiring improvement, and particular recommendations were identified. This learning will support improved preparedness in North Yorkshire, joint organisational learning, and national level improvements.	**11.1** Where possible, use the NYLRF Continuous Improvement Lessons Management process to support NYFRS in embedding learning from their single-agency debrief.	NYLRF Continuous Improvement Lessons Management	**Amber**
			11.2 Use the NYLRF Continuous Improvement Lessons Management process to ensure that appropriate learning is uploaded to the Joint Organisational Learning platform.	NYLRF Continuous Improvement Lessons Management	
			11.3 The NYLRF Secretariat to offer support to other LRFs in wildfire planning, training, or exercise activity.	NYLRF Secretariat	
			11.4 The NYLRF Secretariat to provide an update to the June 2027 Executive Board on the embedding of lessons from the Fylingdales Moor debrief.	NYLRF Secretariat	

Appendix

To help keep the interim report concise, the appendices are not included within the main body of this document. They can be accessed via Resilience Direct using the links provided below.

To produce this report within the agreed timeframe, it should be noted that the appendices may be updated between the publication of the interim report and the release of the final report in June 2026. To support colleagues, the most up to date documents will be uploaded to the same links and will be version controlled.

Appendix A	Aims and objectives of NYLRF debrief
Appendix B	Timeline of the Local Resilience Forum Response
Appendix C	Key NYLRF Command Officers
Appendix D	Weather during the Fylingdales Moor Fire
Appendix E	Humanitarian impacts during response to the fire
Appendix F	Environmental impacts during response to the fire
Appendix G	Infrastructure impacts during response to the fire
Appendix H	Economic impacts during response to the fire
Appendix I	Response capabilities in numbers
Appendix J	Glossary of terms

Photo: Mark Laycock

Appendix A

Aims and objectives of NYLRF debrief

The aim of the debrief was to undertake a NYLRF sponsored debrief into the multi-agency response at the Fylingdales Moor fire incident. This will direct the identification of lessons and continuous improvement processes.

The objectives of the debrief were:

- To establish a multi-agency NYLRF debriefing team who will scope the resources required to undertake a comprehensive process.
- To undertake specific debriefs which cover the following areas:
    - JESIP principles (colocation, coordination, communication, joint understanding of risk, shared situational awareness)
    - Command and tactics
    - Knowledge
    - Communications
    - Resourcing
    - Equipment
    - Planning and briefing
    - Welfare and health
- To produce an interim report with high level recommendations and next steps by the end of January 2026.
- To produce a final report with recommendations by June 2026.
    - This report will be available for political review.
- To follow the NYLRF continuous improvement and lessons identified process to support continual learning within the NYLRF and assist with single agency learning where appropriate.
- To ensure appropriate learning is embedded within NYLRF processes and to be uploaded on to the Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) platform.

The scope of the debrief:

- This NYLRF debrief will focus solely on the multi-agency response to the fire, and will not cover the fire investigation or the recovery phase of the incident.
- The debrief will look to cover the following time period - 30 June 2025 (Initial RMCI notification) - 5 September 2025 (Stand down of NYLRF Major Incident).
    - Data included within this report is reflective of this time period.
- The NYLRF debrief will look to work alongside single agency debriefs to identify multi-agency learning.
- The following aspects and information have not been included within this report:
    - Individual questionnaire replies are not included within the document but have informed interim recommendations and next steps.
- The fire investigation is being undertaken by NYFRS, when the report is complete it will be available via this link: login.resilience.gov.uk

- Minimal financial implications are reported within this document. This is due to the response costs only providing a relatively narrow account of the overall incident impacts. Comprehensive accounts would also include recovery and longer-term moorland restoration costs and these will be provided in a later report and then included within this document to ensure there is a comprehensive account.
- The NYLRF recovery to the incident is still ongoing as of the release of this document and will be debriefed separately. A separate, Fylingdales Moor Fire 2025 Part 2 Recovery Report will be produced. Once completed it will be added to this document to ensure there is a comprehensive report.
- The longer-term recovery of the natural environment, land management and resilience of the area continues and comprehensive data on the long term impacts are not included within this report.

The points below identify how the debrief was undertaken

- NYLRF carries out the multi-agency debriefs utilising the National College of Policing processes.
- Between 29 September and 21 November, the NYLRF online debrief survey was available for colleagues and organisations to identify and share views and recommendations. The following groups were encouraged to feedback views:
    - NYLRF organisations
    - Non NYLRF organisations who were brought into response structures.
    - Political leaders
    - Landowners
- On the back of the initial findings from the questionnaire, there were common themes identified. These themes were used to form the aspects for the focused facilitated debriefs. These covered:

    Debrief 1 - JESIP and command tactics – NYLRF organisations
    - Command and control at the tactical and strategic level
    - The cells required to support a response
    - Documentation and record management for the incident.

    Debrief 2 – JESIP and command tactics – Non NYLRF organisations
    - JESIP with non NYLRF organisations. (RAF Fylingdales / North Yorkshire Moors National Park (NYMNP) / Forestry England / Natural England)

    Debrief 3 - Resourcing / equipment / welfare and health of staff
    - Logistics cell
    - Multi-agency capabilities that can be brought together to support NYFRS in a moorland fire incident.

    Debrief 4 - Communications
    - Media communications, community engagement and role of political officials

    Debrief 5 - NYLRF prior risk knowledge and emergency planning
    - Training, planning, knowledge and preparedness

    Debrief 6 - Welfare and health of the community
    - Coordinating the community health impacts to a moorland fire incident.
    - Individual debrief conversations with key commanders were still ongoing at the time of this report's release. Further learning may be identified ahead of the final report in June 2026. The list of commanders involved is provided at Appendix C.

Appendix B

Timeline of the Local Resilience Forum Response

Incident 1		
Date	**Time**	**Activity**
30.06.25	13:04	RMCI notification for a fire at Langdale Forest

Incident 2		
12.08.25	11:28	RMCI template requested NYFRS
	12:50	RMCI sent
	15:25	RMCI updated
	21:00	MAAT
13:08:25	09:00	MAAT
		First "cook off" of unexploded ordnance
	11:50	Major Incident declared by NYFRS; fire had spread around 5sq km. The fire was divided into seven sectors in total.
	14:00	TCG
	16:00	TCG - Science & Tech Group
14:08:25	09:00	TCG
	13:00	RCG – Environment Group
	16:00	TCG
15:08:25	09:00	TCG
	11:00	SCG
	13:30	TCG
	13:30	Information on the Bellwin scheme from MHCLG requested
	15:00	TCG Logistics cell.
		An additional fire was reported next to the A171 near the Flask Inn
16:08:25	09:00	TCG
17:08:25	09:00	TCG
18:08:25	09:00	TCG
	11:00	SCG
	13:00	TCG
	14:00	TCG Logistics cell
		NYLRF Chair emailed MHCLG regarding the Bellwin scheme and supporting NYFRS.

Incident 2		
19:08:25	09:00	TCG
	12:00	Recovery Cell
20:08:25	09:00	TCG
21:08:25	09:00	TCG
	15:00	Recovery - Environmental subgroup
22:08:25	09:00	TCG
23:08:25		No TCG was to be held unless escalation needed and use of RMCI 11 March briefings to TCG on ResilienceDirect were provided by 1100 hours for reps to read.
24:08:25		No TCG was to be held unless escalation needed and use of RMCI - IIMarch briefings to TCG on ResilienceDirect were provided by 1100 hours for reps to read.
25:08:25	09:00	TCG
		Fire jumped northern firebreak and fire spread north.

Incident 3		
25.08.25	20:00	TCG
26:08:25		Fire continued to spread; Grouse Hill caravan Park evacuated, and the following roads closed A171 and B1416. Partner agencies assisted with drones.
	09:00	TCG
	10:30	TCG
	12:00	TCG - Humanitarian Cell
	13:30	TCG
	14:00	SCG
	18:00	TCG
	20:30	TCG - Evac & shelter cell
	21:30	TCG
27:08:25		Mike Adcock informed the SCG the Bellwin had been approved
27:08:25		Galtres Pickering showground set up as a holding area.
27:08:25		National assistance was requested by Chief Fire Officer Jonathan Dyson; these included 10 fire engines, specialist vehicles and tactical wildfire specialists on the scene.
27:08:25	08:30	TCG - Logistics cell
	09:00	TCG
	11:00	TCG - Evac & shelter
	12:30	TCG - Logistics

Incident 3		
27:08:25	12:20	Humber NY Health Coordination Group
	13:00	TCG
	14:00	SCG
	15:00	Evac & Shelter
	17:00	TCG
28:08:25		National assistance arrived
	08:00	TCG - Logistics
	09:00	TCG
	11:00	TCG - Evac & Shelter
	12:00	TCG - Logistics
	12:30	Humber NY Health Coordination Group
	13:00	TCG
	16:00	TCG
	09:00	TCG
29.08.25	11:00	TCG - Logistics
	11:00	TCG - Evac & Shelter
	12:30	Humber NY Health Coordination Group
	13:00	TCG
	14:00	SCG
	16:00	TCG
30:08:25	09:30	TCG
	16:00	Core agencies/cell lead and agencies that wish to attend
31:08:25		Firebreaks continue to be created.
	09:30	TCG
	16:00	TCG
01.09.25		Roads reopened 20:30, with 30 mph speed limits.
		Highways plant started to leave the scene.
	16:00	TCG
	11:00	Logistics cell
	11:15	Evac & Shelter cell
	12:30	Humber NY Health Coordination Group
	14:00	SCG
	16:00	TCG
	21:00	TCG chair catch up with NYFRS

Incident 3		
02.09.25	09:00	TCG
	12:00	RCG
	12:30	Humber NY Health Coordination Group
	16:00	TCG
03.09.25	09:00	TCG
	15:00	SCG
	16:00	TCG
05.09.25	16:00	TCG - Response close down– no further TCG/SCG meetings

Langdale. Photo: Alice Michelmore-Brown

Appendix C

Key NYLRF Command Officers

SCG Chair		
Ben Mosely	NYP	SCG Chair 1
Mat Walker	NYFRS	SCG Chair 2
Jonathan Dyson	NYFRS	SCG Chair 3
NYLRF Chair		
Richard Flinton	NYC	NYLRF Chair
TCG Chair		
Matt Robinson	NYC	TCG Chair 1
Mark Proctor	NYP	TCG Chair 2
Mark Naylor	NYFRS	TCG Chair 3
James Manning	NYFRS	TCG Chair 4
Evacuation and Shelter		
Alex Sutcliffe	NYC	E and S Chair 1
Logistics		
Jon Darnton	NYFRS	Logistics1
Tony Peel	NYFRS	Logistics2
Karl Battersby	NYC	Logistics3
Humanitarian Cell		
Victoria Turner	NYC	Hum Chair 1
Communications Cell		
Sarah Woodcock	NYFRS	Comms Chair 1
Vanessa Glover	NYC	Comms Chair 2
Rebecca Proctor	YNYMCA	Comms Chair 3 (TBC)
Multi-agency Information Cell		
Mark Peterson	NYC	MAIC Lead 1

Appendix D

Weather during the Fylingdales Moor Fire

SRC_NAME	GEOG_AREA_NAME	HIGH_PRCN_LAT	HIGH_PRCN_LON	ELEVATION	MDC_TIME	DAILY MAX TEMP	DAILY MAX GUST (kts)	DAILY MEAN WIND SPEED (kts)	DAILY RAIN (mm)
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	01/07/2025	18	18	9	8
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	02/07/2025	17.3	37	9	1
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	03/07/2025	19.9	27	10	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	04/07/2025	18.1	34	16	1.4
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	05/07/2025	21.6	33	17	0.6
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	06/07/2025	16.4	20	9	1.2
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	07/07/2025	18.5	37	11	2.2
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	08/07/2025	19	19	8	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	09/07/2025	24.2	21	7	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	10/07/2025	26.7	17	5	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	11/07/2025	24.7	17	6	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	12/07/2025	23	18	6	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	13/07/2025	22.9	15	8	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	14/07/2025	22.9	24	9	4.8
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	15/07/2025	17.6	50	13	22.2
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	16/07/2025	19.1	18	8	0.2
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	17/07/2025	22.1	18	7	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	18/07/2025	23.1	13	5	1.4
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	19/07/2025	18.9	18	7	11.8
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	20/07/2025	20.3	23	7	3.6
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	21/07/2025	19.7	14	5	4
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	22/07/2025	20.1	16	6	9.2
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	23/07/2025	16.3	20	9	1.6
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	24/07/2025	19.4	23	9	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	25/07/2025	22.2	21	7	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	26/07/2025	20.5	16	6	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	27/07/2025	18.3	28	11	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	28/07/2025	19.3	24	9	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	29/07/2025	19	16	6	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	30/07/2025	21.3	16	6	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	31/07/2025	18.5	17	9	6.2
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	01/08/2025	15.7	26	13	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	02/08/2025	19	16	7	1
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	03/08/2025	23.4	28	10	4.8
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	04/08/2025	19.6	42	18	3
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	05/08/2025	18.6	38	18	0
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	06/08/2025	20	26	10	0.2
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262	07/08/2025	21.9	31	14	0

Appendix D

Weather during the Fylingdales Moor Fire

SRC_NAME	GEOG_AREA_NAME	HIGH_PRCN_LAT	HIGH_PRCN_LON	ELEVATION
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262
FYLINGDALES	NORTH YORKSHIRE	54.4	-0.7	262

MDC_TIME	DAILY MAX TEMP	DAILY MAX GUST (kts)	DAILY MEAN WIND SPEED (kts)	DAILY RAIN (mm)
08/08/2025	20.1	31	12	0
09/08/2025	19.7	33	13	0
10/08/2025	21.8	20	8	0
11/08/2025	24.5	18	8	0
12/08/2025	24.4	15	7	0
13/08/2025	27.9	18	9	0
14/08/2025	24.5	21	8	0
15/08/2025	21	18	8	0
16/08/2025	17.2	14	7	0
17/08/2025	16.9	16	7	0.2
18/08/2025	15	13	7	0.6
19/08/2025	14.6	21	10	1.8
20/08/2025	14.6	24	12	0.2
21/08/2025	13.9	21	9	0.6
22/08/2025	17	22	7	0
23/08/2025	15.9	12	5	0.2
24/08/2025	22.3	15	6	0
25/08/2025	25.3	22	10	0
26/08/2025	21.7	24	10	0
27/08/2025	21.3	27	9	3.8
28/08/2025	20.6	30	9	4.4
29/08/2025	18.9	17	8	1.4
30/08/2025	19.6	32	14	5.6
31/08/2025	20.2	32	15	0
01/09/2025	18	29	14	1.6

Appendix E

Humanitarian impacts during response to the fire

Evacuation and Shelter

During the Bank Holiday weekend on 25 August 2025, the fire travelled at a rate that led to the decision, due to the risk to life, to evacuate a number of locations and move residents to a safe location.

This included the Grouse Hill, May Beck, and Flask Caravan Parks, as well as a partial evacuation of businesses north of the B1416.

Following a request from the SCG, the TCG was tasked with developing evacuation and shelter plans should the fire escalate further. However, due to operational activity by Fire and Rescue, partner agencies, and responding farmers, these plans were not required.

Evacuation and shelter plans were produced for the following locations:

- Ravenscar
- Hackness
- Newton Dale
- Goathland
- Sleights
- Stainsacre
- Robin Hood's Bay

Fire in close proximity to Whitby. Photo: Mark Laycock

Each evacuation and shelter plan contained procedures covering the following:

Trigger:

- Decision to evacuate
- Decision to open a rest centre

Action on trigger

- Internal notification
- Multi-agency notification
- Procedure

Evacuation

- Evacuation assembly Area
- Number of residents in zone
- Number and location of vulnerable people
- Number of buildings
- Number of businesses (included in above figures)
- Number of holiday accommodation
- Number of farms
- Number of campsites (caravan and tent pitches)
- Number of care homes/home care
- Number of schools
- Transport requirements

Warning and informing

- Emergency alerts
- Door knocking – number of people required
- Social media
- Standard message

Shelter

- Rest centre

Staffing

- Evacuation
- Rest centres
- Equipment / clothing
- Identification
- Rest centre close down

Air quality monitoring

There is a national network of air quality monitoring stations providing publicly available air quality data across the UK. However, coverage within North Yorkshire is limited, with only one national network monitoring site currently located at High Muffles, a rural background location in the North York Moors above Pickering.

Recognising this limitation in national coverage, NYC Regulatory Services had recently installed 6 additional air quality monitors across North Yorkshire to improve the coverage and availability of real-time air quality data. A further monitor was also installed in Scarborough in direct response to the wildfire incident.

Data from these monitors (particularly the Whitby and Malton monitors) was regularly reported to provide updates that would inform decision-making, in combination with the forecasting/modelling of plumes through the Met Office CHEMETs and local intelligence from the fire service on the ground.

The general direction of the smoke plume usually followed the prevailing wind direction, with particularly notable shifts occurring e.g. 26 August (in line with the wider fire narrative in that period). Periods of poor air quality detected on monitors were generally short-lived (i.e. peaking for a single hourly measurement), indicating a pattern of intermittent exposure.

This intermittent exposure pattern supported the 'shelter in place' approach for the majority of people (i.e. keeping doors and windows closed whilst smoke was present, opening again to ventilate properties once the smoke had passed over). For the small number of people who were instructed to 'evacuate', this was due to the direct fire safety risk rather than the smoke plume.

During the acute response phase air quality levels were reviewed in real time to inform incident management. As part of Recovery the Scientific Team subsequently undertook a retrospective review of air quality monitoring data from the start of the fire (12 August) through to 26 September to assess if there were any sustained or longer-term periods of elevated air pollution.

This review identified three occasions where 8-hour exposure averages were in excess of 70ug/m^3 for PM2.5 and 100ug/m^3 for PM10 on the Whitby monitor. These were:

12 – 13 August
(8-hour average PM2.5 = 76ug/m^3; PM10=103ug/m^3)

26 August
(8-hour average PM2.5 = 96ug/m^3; PM10=133ug/m^3)

31 August – 1 September
(8-hour average PM2.5 = 75ug/m^3; PM10=113ug/m^3)

The UK national air quality objective and European Directive Limit and target value for the protection of human health states that 24-hour exposure averages in excess of 50ug/m^3 for PM10 should not be exceeded more than 35 times a year. Over the period of the investigation, only one such exceedance took place. This was on 26 August where PM10 reached an average of 52ug/m^3.

The 12 – 13 August and 26 August correlate with the original onset of the fire and with the period of significant spread over the August bank holiday, when large amounts of fresh material were burnt.

Provision of public health advice

Public health messaging on the wildfire supplemented the key safety messages shared by the Fire & Rescue service, which were:

If you're nearby, please take precautions:

- Keep windows and doors closed
- Avoid the area if possible

Public health advice was based on wildfires guidance from UKHSA. Key messages were shared on the NY Fire & Rescue incident page and via the North Yorkshire Council incident page.

Given the wildfire initially occurred during a period of hot weather, advice on sheltering in smoke-affected areas had to be adapted to consider thermal comfort as well as potential impacts of smoke inhalation:

Advice on sheltering in smoke-affected areas during hot conditions

- avoid areas affected by smoke.
- draw curtains to limit direct sunlight heating up internal surfaces.
- use fans to recirculate air within the house to help keep cool.
- take a break from the heat by moving to a cooler part of the house (especially for sleeping).
- wear lighter clothing.
- keep hydrated with cool drinks.
- check that central heating, lights and electrical equipment not in use are turned off.
- set any air conditioning (preferably fitted with a HEPA filter) to recirculate mode.
- open windows that are on the opposite side to the plume/smoke when it is safe to do so and when the air feels cooler outside than inside to get air flowing through the home, for example, at night.
- once the smoke has moved away, consider opening doors and windows to allow properties to cool down, being mindful of changing conditions and that the smoke could return.

Wider advice given included:

- If driving in smoky areas keep your windows wound up, air vents closed and switch off air conditioning systems to prevent drawing in outside air.
- In general, exposure to smoke is more likely to affect people who have existing breathing problems, lung or heart conditions (e.g. asthma, bronchitis, chronic pulmonary disease or heart disease). The very young and very old, smokers and people with flu or flu-like illnesses may also be at greater risk after exposure to smoke from fires.
- Smoke can irritate air passages, skin and eyes, resulting in coughing and wheezing, breathlessness and chest pain. Individuals with pre-existing cardiovascular and respiratory conditions, such as asthma, should carry any necessary medication or inhalers with them at all times and seek medical advice if their symptoms worsen, by contacting their GP or NHS 111.
- Anyone experiencing discomfort such as sore eyes, cough or sore throat should consider reducing activity, particularly outdoors.
- Whilst causing short-term poor air quality, exposure to smoke from large-scale wildfires is unlikely to contribute to any long-term health effects.
- Finding more information about staying cool in hot weather here - Hot weather, North Yorkshire Council

Messages were disseminated through the Communications cell of the NYLRF response for other organisations to share through their own routes as well.

In addition to public health advice for the general public, advice was provided through the NYLRF response as part of Tactical and Strategic Coordination Groups.

Interface with the NHS response

Working alongside wider health and social care colleagues was vital to:

a) Gather information on what health challenges individuals were experiencing that was leading to any increased use of health services e.g. increased hospital attendances etc.

b) Provide health and care colleagues with information about the ongoing wildfire situation to help inform their response both to wildfire related health issues and also maintaining business as usual work.

Public health colleagues attended NHS Health Coordination Group meetings to provide input on local air quality monitoring and modelling to support those delivering health services in the local area.

Regular updates from health and social care partners including the NHS and the ambulance service confirmed that they were not seeing an increase in activity due to people being affected by smoke from the wildfire. However, due to the closure of the A171 between Whitby and Scarborough there were a small number of conveyances from Whitby that were redirected towards James Cook Hospital in Middlesbrough whilst the road was closed.

Summary

Whilst overall the NHS did not report a pattern of increased attendances from people with health issues attributed to the wildfire, this does not negate that some residents in close proximity to the wildfire did experience acute health effects such as respiratory issues and eye irritation. People from key groups who are more susceptible to the health impacts of wildfires including children, the elderly and people with pre-existing health conditions are more likely to have experienced these impacts, along with those whose occupations required them to spend more time outside during the period of the wildfire in areas impacted by smoke.

Photo: Mark Laycock

Appendix F

Environmental impacts during response to the fire

Impacts on Forestry England land

Area impacted

An estimated 200ha of Forestry England land was affected by the fire. This approximately includes 29ha of heathland, 5ha of riparian corridor and 166ha of plantation forest, which includes forest roads, and small areas of wetland, heathland and grassland habitat.

Forestry impacts

Whilst the wildfire covered a large area, it was predominantly in the peat or ground vegetation. There was limited evidence of complete combustion to trees.

Langdale. Photo: Forestry England

The scorching effect of the fire caused significant damage to young, tree crops (less than 12 years old), which will now need to be felled. Approximately 37ha was scorched in Langdale Forest and 42ha in Sneaton Forest. Forest Plans require the trees to be cleared, the ground repaired and replanted.

Approximately 16ha of mature tree crops (~55 years old) were affected in Langdale and Sneaton Forests respectively (32ha in total). The harvesting of these crops will need to take place earlier than planned, within the next 2-3 years.

Ecological and wider environmental impacts

The fire affected 21.75ha of designated biodiversity sites (SSSI/SAC/SPA) on Forestry England land.

There is insufficient data at present to understand the full extent of ecological and environmental impacts on designated and non-designated land within Forestry England's ownership.

Historic Environment impacts

The extent of historic environment impact is currently unknown, however, at least one Scheduled Ancient Monument was impacted by the construction of firebreaks.

Photo: Mark Laycock

Environmental impact to Fylingdales Moor

Receptor	Significance	Summary	Metric	Commentary
Blanket bog and peatland	High	Vegetation and peat combustion.	1,393ha	Shallow and deep peats combusted across moorland burn area.
Moorland habitats	High	Habitat loss and fragmentation.	1,393ha	Loss of Atlantic Wet Heath (c. 920ha), European Dry Heath (c. 300ha), Acid Flush (c. 60ha), Fen–Valley mire (15ha) and Bracken (c. 98ha).
Protected species	Medium–High	Nesting and refuge disturbance.	1,467ha	Entire burn area liable to be used by range of protected species, including goshawk, merlin, adder, common lizard and water vole amongst other species.
Carbon storage	High	Peat carbon emissions from direct combustion of peat soil.	54,258 tonnes CO_2e	Figure based on initial analysis by Exeter University. 1210ha of burn severity analysis gives a figure of 38 tonnes per hectare. Extrapolated with the assumption of the same burn severity patterns across the remainder of the site gives a total estimated carbon loss of 54,258 tonnes.
Hydrology	Medium–High	Altered runoff and erosion.	1,467ha	Erosion noted across entire burn area. Hydrological impact may be far wider than the area of the fire due to sediment movement and the impact of mobilised pollutants. Without the appropriate monitoring by experts this is not possible to quantify.

Environmental impact to Fylingdales Moor

Receptor	Significance	Summary	Metric	Commentary
Archaeology	High	Damage to deposits, structures and ongoing post fire erosion.	c. 700ha	Severe damage from the fire affected a wide range of archaeological sites. Post-fire assessment indicates that close to 50% of the burned area contains some form of archaeological remains. The fire has severely impacted both palaeoenvironmental potential and capacity to yield C14 dates for many sites. Until vegetation is reestablished archaeological deposits are continuing to erode due to wind and water action. Thirteen Scheduled Monuments are considered 'At Risk' because of the fire and subsequent erosion. Two further SM's are At Risk due to firebreak cutting. The majority of archaeological remains affected are not scheduled, and a number of these clearly meet the criteria for statutory protection.
Historic landscape	Medium–High	Character change.	1,467ha	Loss of vegetation and associated peat soils has severely affected the historic character of the moor in the short term. Longer term, the loss of peat soils means that there will be some permanent changes to the vegetation communities and character of the moor.
Public access	Medium	Closures and safety restrictions.	Total rights of way closed: 11,815m 7.3 miles (11.8km)	Within the fire site, significant sections of the rights of way network and open access land were impacted. During the fire incident emergency closures were put in place on all access routes that crossed or connected with routes that crossed the fire site. The presence of un-mapped, unexploded ordnance added extra complexity when surveying the site, post-fire. The surface quality of the affected routes was varied, some areas looking almost untouched with other areas destroyed with essential enhancement work required before use. The major damage had a consequential effect on the integrity of the surfaces of the ROW and the surrounds, making them much more susceptible to surface water runoff and gullying.

Appendix G

Infrastructure impacts during response to the fire

Impact on the road network and surrounding area, initial closures (26 August)

On 26 August, requests were received from the police to close the main A171 Scarborough–Whitby coastal route and the B1416 from Whitby to the A171 east of Ruswarp. These closures were requested due to the proximity of the fire to the road network and the impact of drifting smoke.

The diversion route for the A171 was significant, resulting in an additional journey distance of approximately 45 miles and an increased journey time of around **1 hour and 20 minutes**. The diversion utilised the A171 south to Scarborough, the A170 east to Pickering, the A169 north to Whitby, and the A171 east and south through Whitby.



The diversion route for the A171. The diversion utilised the A171 south to Scarborough, the A170 east to Pickering, the A169 north to Whitby, and the A171 east and south through Whitby. © Crown Copyright and Database Rights 2026 Ordnance Survey 100017946

Escalation of closures and network management

The closure of these two key routes led to a number of further requests from the police to close minor roads in the vicinity. Traffic was persistently attempting to circumvent the closure points on the A171 and B1416 in order to rejoin the A171 near the fire location.

Over the following two days, it became necessary to close an additional 12 roads either adjoining or transiting between the A171 and B1416. To manage inappropriate use of the local road network, five control points were staffed daily between 0800 and 2200.

Wider network impacts

Further impacts were experienced along the major diversion route, particularly in Snainton and Thornton Dale. To manage increased traffic flows, additional diversion signage was deployed in Thornton Dale to control movements around an already congested junction. In Snainton, “No Parking” cones were installed along the A170 to alleviate bottlenecks caused by roadside parking.

Preparation for network reopening

Following the weekend of 30 – 31 August 2025, discussions commenced regarding reopening the closed road network. Inspections of carriageways were undertaken to assess any damage resulting from fire defence operations. These inspections identified a small number of minor repairs, which were completed in the following days.

It was agreed that a reduced Enforcement Zone would be required upon reopening, incorporating lower speed limits and no-stopping/no-overtaking restrictions to maintain traffic flow and manage the risk of motorists stopping or parking inappropriately. In addition, wild animal warning signs were required, as sections of livestock fencing across the moor had been damaged by the fire, increasing the likelihood of animals on the carriageway.

Enforcement zone and reopening

All necessary elements for the Enforcement Zone were installed prior to reopening. The road network reopened at 2200 hours on 1 September 2025, at which point all major and adjoining road closures were removed.

During the subsequent week, the Fire and Rescue Service maintained a watching brief. This was supported by the installation of temporary traffic signals at locations where water extraction operations were ongoing, most notably on the B1410 (The Carrs) at Ruswarp.



Red shows the extent of all road closures.

Green shows local roads that were left open.

Closure points (marked **Blue**) staffed between 0800 and 2200 daily.

Reduction and stand-down

As the wider impacts of the fire reduced, the Enforcement Zone was reduced in size on 16 September 2025. However, it was reported that compliance with the restrictions had largely diminished from 5 September onwards. The Enforcement Zone remained in place until the incident was formally stood down.

Wider impacts and operational effects

The transport, access, and service disruptions described above significantly restricted road access to residents and essential services only on affected routes. Commuting traffic and commercial activity experienced increased journey times, higher fuel costs, and additional vehicle wear and tear. Environmental impacts included increased vehicle emissions as a result of extended diversion routes.

Direct damage to the road network was limited and largely confined to areas affected by defence operations, rather than extensive damage caused directly by the fire. However, business-as-usual highway maintenance activities were significantly curtailed due to the staffing demands associated with managing road closures. It is estimated that this resulted in an approximate three-week delay to routine maintenance across the wider network. Comparative data indicates a 33% delay in work orders and a 13% increase in past-priority completions during this period.

RAF Fylingdales

RAF Fylingdales in North Yorkshire provides a continuous ballistic missile early warning service to the UK and US Governments, ensuring a surprise missile attack cannot succeed.

The RADAR is capable of tracking objects including satellites and debris, 3,000 miles into space.

Approximately 320 Service Personnel, Ministry of Defence Police, and civilian staff work on site.

During the incident RAF Fylingdales observed the fire at distance, and over following days it was clearly highlighted that the fire could pose a risk to the station and its unique capabilities.

RAF Fylingdales on-base firefighters and defence fire and rescue resources provided support to the protection of the site. RAF Firefighters from a number of RAF units were deployed to support local staff. This included deployment of a specialist vehicle. The joint response with NYFRS and others reduced the threat to the site.

RAF Fylingdales in foreground. Photo: NYLRF

Appendix H

Economic impacts during response to the fire

It is evident that the cost to the response to the Fylingdales Moor fire was significant to local businesses, communities, landowners, common grazers, farmers, public organisations and central government.

Although response costs have been identified, minimal financial impacts are reported within the initial version of this document. This is due to the response costs only providing a relatively narrow account of the overall incident impacts. Comprehensive accounts should also include recovery and longer-term moorland restoration costs and these will be provided in a later report and then an updated version of this document will be released.

Appendix I

Response capabilities in numbers

Organisation	Capability	Number	Comment
NYC Highways	Number of employees from Managing Director to Operative have been deployed on Fylingdales for a total of 2,517 hours	39	At the request of Fire and Rescue to support their response
	Portaloos were deployed to various locations, these were cleaned and serviced throughout the duration	10	
	Mobile welfare vans deployed	3	
	Sets of tower lights	5	
	30t excavators deployed to site	7	
	D6 dozers deployed to site	4	
	Number of Fuel bowsers deployed	3	
	Number of water bowsers deployed	3	
	Number Low Loaders on call to mobilise plant between locations	2	
	Generators to power welfare	2	
	Approximate litres of fuel supplied to fire engines, plant, generators and equipment to date	11,000	
	Smaller ancillary plant and equipment to assist with on ground requests		

Appendix J

Glossary of terms

Term	Definition
Aeroqual AQS1 Monitors	Air quality monitoring devices used to measure particulate matter concentrations (PM2.5 and PM10) at fixed locations across North Yorkshire.
Bellwin Scheme	A UK Government emergency financial assistance mechanism enabling local authorities to recover eligible costs incurred during Major Incidents.
Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004	The primary UK legislation establishing duties for emergency preparedness, response, and recovery, including the creation of Local Resilience Forums.
Communications Cell	A multi-agency group responsible for coordinating media communications, public messaging, and political liaison during an incident.
Continuous Improvement Lessons Management Group	An NYLRF mechanism for capturing, managing, and embedding learning from incidents, exercises, and debriefs.
Control Points	Staffed locations established to enforce road closures, diversions, and access controls during an incident.
Evacuation and Shelter Cell	A tactical group responsible for planning and delivering evacuations, rest centres, and shelter arrangements for affected populations.
Firebreak	A deliberately cleared or reinforced strip of land intended to prevent or slow the spread of wildfire.
Humanitarian Cell	A group coordinating the welfare, health, and humanitarian needs of affected communities, including vulnerable people.
Integrated Emergency Management Group (IEMG)	A partnership group supporting multi-agency information sharing, risk assessment, and preparedness activities.
Joint Decision Model (JDM)	A structured framework supporting shared decision making by emergency responders during complex or fast-moving incidents.

Term	Definition
Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP)	National principles promoting effective joint working between emergency services: • Co location • Communication • Coordination • Joint understanding of risk • Shared situational awareness
Logistics Cell	A tactical support group responsible for sourcing, managing, and coordinating resources, equipment, and supplies.
Major Incident	An event requiring the implementation of special arrangements by emergency responders due to its scale, severity, or complexity.
Multi-Agency Advisory Teleconference (MAAT)	A meeting convened to share information, brief partners, and undertake joint decision making at an early stage of an incident.
Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC)	A coordination hub responsible for managing and sharing information, data, and situational reporting during an incident.
North Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service (NYFRS)	Saving lives through prevention, protection and emergency response in North Yorkshire.
North Yorkshire Local Resilience Forum (NYLRF)	North Yorkshire Local Resilience Forum, responds to large-scale emergencies when a combined multi-agency coordination results in a more effective and efficient outcome.
PM2.5 / PM10	Measures of airborne particulate matter: • **PM2.5:** particles ≤2.5 microns in diameter • **PM10:** particles ≤10 microns in diameter Measured in micrograms per cubic metre (μg/m^3) and used to assess smoke exposure and public health impacts.
Recommendation Rating	A colour-coded system used within the report to indicate the priority of recommendations: • **Red:** High priority • **Amber:** Medium priority • **Yellow:** Low priority • **Green:** No action required

Term	Definition
ResilienceDirect	A secure national platform used to share emergency planning documentation and incident information between partner agencies.
Response to Major and Critical Incident (RMCI)	The agreed NYLRF framework and notification process for escalating and coordinating multi-agency responses.
Rest Centre	A temporary facility established to provide shelter, welfare, and support to evacuees.
SCG – Strategic Coordination Group	A multi-agency group providing strategic oversight, setting objectives, and managing high-level risks during a Major Incident.
SSSI (Site of Special Scientific Interest)	A nationally designated environmental area afforded legal protection due to its ecological or geological importance.
Stand Down	The formal cessation of coordinated incident response arrangements when the emergency phase has concluded.
Tactical Coordination Group (TCG)	A multi-agency group responsible for implementing tactics and coordinating operational response activities.
UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA)	A national body providing guidance and thresholds for public health risks, including smoke exposure and air quality.
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)	Explosive military munitions remaining from historic activity, presenting a significant hazard during wildfire operations.
Vulnerable Persons	Individuals who may require additional assistance during an emergency due to age, health, disability, or social circumstances.
Wildfire	An uncontrolled fire affecting vegetation, moorland, forestry, or rural environments, often influenced by weather and fuel conditions.

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Local Resilience Forum